Book Review by Kaplan, Richard L.
[Vol. 129:486
BOOK REVIEW
FINANCIAL INVASION OF THE U.S.A. By Earl H. Fry. New
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$9.95.
RICHARD L. KAPLAN t
Within the last decade, foreign investment in the United States
has increased to an extent unprecedented in our modern history.
The causes of this often frenzied acquisition of American companies,
homes, and farmland are several, ranging from the drastic decline
of the dollar and the progress of Eurocommunism to the post-1973
oil price increases that have sent a veritable torrent of money to
the Middle East.1 These factors all appear likely to continue in the
foreseeable future, presaging the acquisition of even more domestic
companies, homes, and farmland by non-Americans.
The implications of these developments for the United States
and its legal system have troubled many citizens and policymakers,
but dispassionate, comprehensive analyses of this phenomenon have
not been generally available.2 Professor Fry's book, Financial In-
vasion of the U.S.A.,3 attempts to provide such an analysis and to
address the policy ramifications of significant foreign investment in
the United States economy. His task is not small, but his book is a
major contribution to the burgeoning literature of foreign-invest-
ment regulation.
Despite its somewhat alarmist title, the book generally eschews
polemics, marshaling a variety of statistical information from govern-
mental and private sources, and presenting a fairly balanced view
of the significance of this surge in foreign investment. Professor
Fry begins by documenting in meticulous detail the long history of
foreign-primarily Western European-investment in this country,
often enlivening his account with pertinent anecdotes.4 Through-
f Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.S. 1970, Indiana Uni-
versity; J.D. 1976, Yale University.
1 See generally Katz, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States-Advan-
tages and Barriers, 11 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 473, 474-76 (1979).
2 For an impassioned treatment of this subject, see K. CRowE, AMEmcA FoR
SALE (1978). For the results of a major study of foreign investment undertaken
at Congress's request, see U.S. DE,'T oF ComImacE, FoREiGN DumCT INVzsrMrMrr
IN THE UNITED STATES (1976) (nine volumes) [hereinafter cited as FonmREN Dmzcr
INVESTUMNT].




out this history, he emphasizes the acquisitions of, and the positive
contributions made by, investors from Canada, Japan, and Western
Europe, particularly Germany and the Netherlands. This orienta-
tion-reflecting in part his residence at one time in Europe 5-is
probably justifiable because, even today, most direct 6 foreign invest-
ment in American companies emanates from those countries.7 As
Professor Fry demonstrates, most of these acquisitions have gen-
erated little controversy, although there have been some prominent
exceptions, such as the takeover of Pennsylvania's Copperweld Cor-
poration by the French giant, Soci6td Imetal, a few years ago.s
But the focus of today's foreign-investment debate concerns the
seemingly endless gusher of so-called "petro-dollars" coming from
the oil exporting, principally Arab, countries of the Middle East.
This phenomenon is much more recent in origin, being almost ex-
clusively a product of the post-1973 period, and threatens to dwarf
previous waves of foreign investment by comparison. In Professor
Fry's effort to avoid hysterics, however, he minimizes the scope of
recent Arab investment and the differences between such invest-
ment and the earlier European, Japanese, and Canadian experiences
in this country.
This minimization of the extent of Arab investment is in part
caused by the lack of data after 1977, leaving the tremendous oil
profits of 1978 and 1979 necessarily unconsidered. Although this
limitation might be attributable to the book's publication deadline,
the lack of post-1977 data skews the figures presented by under-
stating, perhaps unintentionally, the extent of Arab investment in
the United States. The data that are presented, moreover, are
woefully inadequate, as Professor Fry occasionally acknowledges. 9
Nearly all of the analyses of foreign ownership cited are based on
voluntary responses to questionnaires.' Because many foreign in-
vestors, particularly Middle Eastern sheiks and potentates, tend to
prefer anonymity, these data are more likely to disclose Canadian
than Kuwaiti ownership.
5 See id. v.
6 "Direct" investment refers to "the direct and/or indirect ownership of 10
percent or more of the voting stock of a United States corporation-by a non-U.S.
citizen." Id. 5 (quoting 3 FoHEIN DmEcT INVssTmmT, supra note 2, at A-i).
See also 22 U.S.C. § 3102(10) (1976).
7 Direct investment from Canada, Japan, and Western Europe accounted for
87.8% of total foreign direct investment in the United States as of 1976. See
E. FRY, supra note 3, at 9.
8 Id. 9-10.
9 Id. 5-6, 110, 144. See id. 144: It is "nearly impossible to determine how
much land is actually controlled by foreign interests."
10 See id. 163 n.9.
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As a legal matter, the federal government did not even begin
requiring disclosure of foreign investments until 1979. The Inter-
national Investment Survey Act of 1976 11 mandates reports of
foreign acquisitions of new or existing United States business enter-
prises,12 but the regulations implementing this legislation did not
become effective until January 1, 1979.13 Similarly, the Agricultural
Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 14 requires reports of
foreign acquisitions of United States farmland,15 but once again, the
implementing regulations did not become operative until May 8,
1979.16 Both of these statutes impose significant civil penalties on
investors who fail to comply with applicable reporting require-
ments,' 7 although neither the Department of Commerce nor the
Department of Agriculture, the two enforcing agencies involved,
has explained how it plans to ferret out nonreporting investors.
That problem notwithstanding, the data these statutes will elicit
will undoubtedly be superior to pre-1979 information, and it is
regrettable, therefore, that Professor Fry's study could not have in-
corporated these new sources of information.18
The dated statistical data that Professor Fry does present are
further skewed by the fact that Middle Eastern investors rarely in-
vest directly. It is common knowledge among international law
specialists that foreign investors usually channel their investments
through entities organized in the Netherlands Antilles, the British
11Pub. L. No. 94-472, 90 Stat 2059 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108
(1976)). The President delegated his authority under this statute to the Depart-
ment of Commerce in 1977. Exec. Order No. 11,961, 3 C.F.R. 86 (1978), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 12,013, 3 C.F.R. 147 (1978).
12 An investment is reportable if the foreign owner's share of the business,
including portions he controls "indirectly," constitutes at least 10% of the enterprise
in question. See 22 U.S.C. § 3102(8), (10) (1976).
13 15 C.F.R. §§ 806.1-.17 (1980).
14 Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (Supp.
I1 1979)). See generally Hendrickson, The Agricultural Foreign Investment Dis-
closure Act of 1978. Don't Panic!, 13 INT'L LAw. 407 (1979); Note, Disclosure
of Foreign Direct Investment in United States Agricultural Property, 12 VND. J.
TnANSNAT'L L. 665 (1979).
15 Reportable investments in "agricultural land" include land used for farming,
forestry, or timber production. 7 U.S.C. § 3508 (Supp. III 1979).
167 C.F.R. §§781.1-.4 (1980).
3-722 U.S.C. § 3105(a) (1976) (penalty of up to $10,000); 7 U.S.C. § 3502(a),
(b) (Supp. I1 1979) (penalty of up to 25% of the parcel's fair market value).
The International Investment Survey Act of 1976 also includes criminal sanctions
for a willful failure to file the required reports. See 22 U.S.C. § 3105(c) (1976)
(fines of up to $10,000, plus imprisonment of up to one year, may be imposed on
the foreign investor, including corporate officers and agents).
18 Preliminary data show a doubling of annual foreign investment between
1978 and 1979. Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
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Virgin Islands, Liechtenstein, or some other exotic "tax haven." 19
In addition to this "Delawarization" 20 of international finance,
foreign investments may also be directed through American banks
or American lawyers acting as trustees or heads of consortia.21 These
strategies are employed for a variety of reasons other than a desire
for anonymity; for example, a foreign investor may want to secure
special tax treaty benefits, 22 to avoid local agitation, or to circum-
vent foreign currency control laws. Irrespective of the objectives in
any particular case, the consequence of these practices is the same-
all foreign investment, especially that of Arab investors, is seriously
understated.
On the other hand, if one thinks that foreign investment is a
healthy development at the one percent level, should this assessment
necessarily change at the twenty or fifty percent level? Professor
Fry does not answer this question directly, but he does suggest
rather strongly that the increasing paranoia 23 on this subject is un-
justified because the value of United States investments overseas
exceeds the value of foreign investments in the United States, once
19 See generally W. Dr.,oND & D. Dr.m!oND, TAx HAvENs OF =su Wor=
(1978); M. LANCER, PRAcTicAL INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING (1979); A. STAn-
cHmrD, TAx HAvENs FOR CoRPoRATIONS (1979); Forry, Planning Investments from
Abroad in United States Real Estate, 9 INT'L LAw. 239 (1975); Vogel, Bernstein
& Nitsche, Inward Investments in Securities and Direct Operations Through the
British Virgin Islands: How Serious a Rival to the Netherlands Antilles Island
Paradise?, 34 TAx L. REv. 321 (1979).
The impact of these advantages can only be conjectured from the finding that
20.5% of all foreign investment in the United States was held by Netherlands in-
vestors, the largest per-country share. E. FRY, supra note 3, at 8 (1976 data).
Although large Dutch investors do exist, such as Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever,
see id. 43, many investors from other countries were probably also included if they
became "Dutchmen" to take advantage of the favorable Netherlands Antilles tax
treaty.
2oUnlike "Finlandization" or "Balkanization," this newly coined term does not
imply any threat to the locality in question. Rather, "Delawarization" refers to the
propensity of American corporations to incorporate in Delaware, despite their lack
of offices, plants, or other operating facilities in that state. This phenomenon is
analogous to the use of farm tax shelters by, in Professor Chirelstein's words, "doc-
tors, dentists, movie-stars--who have never driven a tractor or milked a cow."
M. CHI ELsTEw, FEDERAL INcoME TAxATION 212-13 (2d ed. 1979).
21 E. FxY, supra note 3, at 110.
22 See generally I. Bisc-miL & R. FEINsCHBE]BER, FuNDAiwNTALs OF INTER-
NATIONAL TAUX.ATION 203-13 (1977); Surrey, International Tax Conventions: How
They Operate and What They Accomplish, 23 J. TAx. 364 (1965). For a discus-
sion on the procedural development of these treaties, see STAFFS OF THE JOINT
Coina. ON TAXATION AND TBM SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELAToNs, 9 6TH CONG.,
IST SESS., TAx TREATeS: STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATION AND RATIFICATION OF TAX
TrEATIs AND STATUS OF PROPOSED TAX TREATmis 1-2 (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
23 See, e.g., Frazier, National Sentiment Against Land Holdings of Foreigners
Strikes Chord in Oklahoma, Wall St. J., Jly 7, 1980, at 13, col. 4 (state attorney
general warns that "Idi Amin could be your next-door neighbor").
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again emphasizing Western Europe.24 Moreover, he takes great
solace in the local property law restrictions that limit the amount
of land foreigners may own,25 although these restrictions often have
more bark than bite.
26
Indeed, it is the dissatisfaction with these very "restrictions"
that is largely responsible for the recently enacted tax on sales of
United States real estate by foreign investors.27 This legislation
eliminated a long-established tax exemption 2 in an attempt to
decrease the incentives for foreign investment, but not without
raising several complex legal problems in the process. Conflicts
with existing tax treaties,2 9 enforceability questions in the absence
24 E. FRY, supra note 3, at 8, 95, 143.
25 Id. 98. These limitations necessarily vary considerably from state to state
and are summarized in Appendix I, "State Restrictions on Alien Ownership of Real
Estate." Id. 148-55. See also Committee on Foreign Investment in U.S. Real
Estate, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate: Federal and State Laws Affecting
the Foreign Investor, 14 REAL PRoP. PNoB. & Tn. J. 1, 18-49 (1979); Fisch, State
Regulation of Alien Land Ownership, 43 Mo. L. REv. 407 (1978); Griffin, Antitrust
Constraints on Acquisitions by Aliens in the United States, 13 INT'L LAw. 427
(1979); Note, Regulation of Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 33 TAx LAw.
586, 613-22 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Regulation of Foreign Investment].
26 See Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate,
60 MINN. L. REv. 621 (1976).
2 7 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, §§ 1121-1125, 94
Stat. 2599 (1980) (adding I.R.C. § 897). See generally Green, Proposed
Legislation Affecting Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 6 INT'L TAX J. 454
(1980); Regulation of Foreign Investment, supra note 25, at 606-13.
28See S. REP. No. 504, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
S. REP. No. 504]. Even the existing tax exemption does not apply to all foreign
investors. Generally, only those foreigners who are not resident in the United
States more than 182 days a year and are not engaged in a United States "trade
or business" qualify. See LR.C. §§864(c)(2), 871(a)(2), 881(a); Treas. Reg.
§§1.871-7(d)(2)(ii), 1.871-8(b)(1) (1974); id. §§1.881-2(a)(1), 1.882-1(b)
(2) (ii) (1973). Thus, many foreign investors are already taxable on gains derived
from the sale of United States real estate. See, e.g., Inez de Amodia, 34 T.C. 894
(1960), aff'd on other grounds, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962); Jan Casimir Lewen-
haupt, 20 T.C. 151 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 221 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1955). See
also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAs RY, TA X TIoN OF FoREIGN L vmsTMEN n U.S.
REAL ESTATE (1979) [hereinafter cited as TAXATION OF FOREIGN IvEsTm:NT];
Klein, Investments by Foreign Persons in United States Real Estate, 2 J. REA.
EST. TAx. 265 (1975); Knight, Planning for Foreign Investments in U.S. Real
Estate, 36 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1081 (1978); McDonald, Income Tax Planning
for the Nonresident Alien Investor, 31 S. CAL. TAx INST. 743 (1979); Sturm,
Taxation of the Foreign Investor in the United States, 55 TAXEs 542 (1977);
Regulation of Foreign Investment, supra note 25, at 590-606. See generally B.
BrrrxE & J. EusicE, FEan.i. INcom TAXATioN OF COnROnrlONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERs g 17.02, at 17-11 to 17-19 (4th ed. 1979).
29 See TAXAON OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 28, at 53-54; Hollings-
worth & Banks, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate: An Analysis of Code-Treaty
Interaction, 52 J. TAX. 38 (1980). The new bill's effective date is postponed for
five years in the case of treaty-country investors. Omnibus Reconcilation Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1125(c), 94 Stat. 2599 (1980). This postponement
terminates prior to 1985 if the tax treaty is renegotiated before that time. Id.
§ 1125(c)(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2599 (1980).
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of any withholding tax arrangements, 0 and coordination with other
Code sections allowing tax-deferred transactions 31 merely head the
list of difficult problems newly created. Furthermore, the notion
that a tax on the sale of property is an effective way of discouraging
purchases of such property is itself rather curious because such taxes
do not become payable until the property is sold.32 Yet, Professor
Fry champions this development by saying that "capital gains loop-
holes in U.S. tax laws that currently work to the advantage of over-
seas investors should also be eliminated immediately." 3 Why this
is so is not clear from his analysis.
In any case, the tax bill recently enacted applies only to real
estate investments, whether made directly or through holding com-
panies. 4  All other foreign investments are not affected. Why the
30 Withholding tax provisions were included in § 6 of H.R. 6007, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 125 CoNG. ikc. Hl, 473 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1979). See also S. REP.
No. 504, supra note 28, at 9-11; Richards, The Foreign Seller of U.S. Real Estate:
Withholding Requirements, 6 INT'L TAx J. 292 (1980). These provisions were
omitted from the version adopted by the Conference Committee. See H.R. REP.
No. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 190-91 (1980). Instead, enforcement relies on
the reporting requirements imposed by I.R.C. § 6039C, added by Omnibus Recon-
ciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1123(a), 94 Stat. 2599 (1980).
31 The new tax generally does not apply if the transaction would otherwise
qualify under one of the Code's nonrecognition provisions, such as those pertaining
to corporate reorganizations or exchanges of like-kind property. See I.R.C.
§897(d)(1)(B), (e)(1), added by Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-499, § 1122(a), 94 Stat. 2599 (1980). Certain exceptions are provided,
however: for example, I.R.C. § 337, dealing with sales of corporate assets pur-
suant to a liquidation, does not apply to real property sales made by foreign
corporations. See I.R.C. § 897(d)(2). See also I.R.C. § 897(c)(2), authorizing
regulations to delineate the applicability of nonrecognition provisions where "neces-
sary or appropriate to prevent the avoidance of Federal income taxes."
32 The committee report explains the purpose of the tax as follows:
The committee believes that it is essential to establish equity of tax
treatment in U.S. real property between foreign and domestic investors.
The committee does not intend by the provisions of this bill to impose a
penalty on foreign investors or to discourage foreign investors from invest-
ing in the United States. However, the committee believes that the
United States should not continue to provide an inducement through the
tax laws for foreign investment in U.S. real property which affords the
foreign investor a number of mechanisms . . . effectively exempting him
from U.S. tax on the gain realized on disposition of the property.
S. iP. No. 504, supra note 28, at 6 (emphasis supplied). How one can discon-
tinue an "inducement" without "discouraging" the desired activity is a sophistry
,only Congress can believe. For an examination of the general policies respecting
foreign investment, see Niehuss, Foreign Investment in the United States: A Review
.of Government Policy, 16 VA. J. INTrL L. 65 (1975). See also Comment, Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States: Possible Restrictions at Home and a New
Climate for American Investment Abroad, 26 Am. U. L. 1kv. 109 (1976).
33 E. FRY, supra note 3, at 147.
34 See I.R.C. § 897(c), added by Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-499, § 1122(a), 94 Stat. 2599 (1980) (a "real property interest" can in-
clude stock in a "United States real property holding organization"-a corporation,
partnership, or trust whose major asset is U.S. real estate). Extensive constructive
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least mobile of all assets was thought to be the most endangered
(and thus requiring control) is far from obvious, but this new tax
does substantiate Professor Fry's prediction that if present restric-
tions on foreign investment are tightened, the new strictures will
probably be applied first to real estate. 35
Actually, this preference for foreign investments in assets other
than real estate is nothing new. For many years now, state govern-
ments have virtually fallen over themselves in their efforts to entice
industrial and commercial foreign investment to their states. One
of the most useful aspects of this book, in fact, is the extended dis-
cussion of these development programs, their targets, and their
successes. 36
Despite these efforts, however, Middle Eastern investors have
generally avoided new plant acquisitions or similar manufacturing
commitments, preferring instead the safety of government securities.
As a result, foreign investors as a group are the federal government's
largest creditor, and Saudi Arabia is the single largest holder of
Federal National Mortgage Association paper.37 Indeed, bank cer-
tificates of deposit and short-term government obligations have be-
come the principal mechanisms used thus far to "recycle" the
billions of dollars spent annually on foreign oil.
This practice is not without its dangers, however, even though
Professor Fry chooses not to acknowledge them. Instead, he states
that "it is difficult to perceive how the OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations could nefariously use their
U.S. investments as a retaliatory weapon against American support
of Israel," 38 although he concedes that a sudden withdrawal of their
dollars would precipitate "some havoc." 39 He attempts to mollify
ownership and asset attribution rules are also provided to prevent multitiered cir-
cumventions of the tax. See S. REP. No. 504, supra note 28, at 8-9.
35 E. FRY, supra note 3, at 115 (noting the possible vulnerability of United
States food supplies should American agricultural land become controlled by foreign
owners). See generally Gaffney, Social and Economic Impacts of Foreign Invest-
ment in United States Land, 17 NAT. REsoUrcEs J. 377 (1977); see also Drinkhall
& Guyon, Real-Estate Purchases By Foreigners Climb, Stirring Wide Debate, Wall
St. J., Sept. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (farmers believe that foreign buyers, unencum-
bered by capital gain taxes, are bidding up the price of United States farmland).
36 E. Fny, supra note 3, at 118-38. See also id. 158-61 (Appendix II: "State
Programs Which Provided Incentives, Special Services, and General Assistance to
Attract Domestic and Foreign Industry, 1977"). In fact, the majority of these
states actually maintain development offices in Europe to facilitate their efforts to
attract foreign investors. Challenge in Reverse, The Economist, Oct. 25, 1980, at
3, col. 3 (Special Survey).





the anxiety this scenario engenders by asserting that "there is no
credible evidence available to indicate that the OPEC investors
have even seriously considered such an option." 40 But in the very
next paragraph, he provides just such "credible evidence" by re-
porting the Arab threat to withdraw funds from Canada after Prime
Minister Joe Clark suggested moving the Canadian embassy in Israel
to Jerusalem. A smoking gun with someone else's name on it
perhaps, but a smoking gun nevertheless.
This Pollyannish air of unreality also permeates his discussion
of the impact of massive foreign investment on American life. He
does chronicle the pervasiveness of foreign investments here, from
Australian ownership of the Village Voice to Dutch ownership of
Good Humor ice cream 4 1 but in so doing, he implies that foreign
investors are pretty much all alike and pretty much like American
investors at that. This exegesis is well-written and convincing,
insofar as it demonstrates that "foreign investment' is neither new
nor peculiarly Middle Eastern in origin. Canadian, German,
Dutch, and Japanese investors have all been active in America for
some time, operating conventional businesses in largely conventional
ways.42 That point is very important to remember in today's emo-
tionally charged debates, and it alone justifies Professor Fry's ex-
position.
But the more recent arrival of the Middle Eastern investor may
not be so easily subsumed into the general "foreign investor" para-
digm. Arab governments have felt little hesitancy in attaching
ideologically oriented, noneconomic conditions to their business
deals.43 Within the last few years, in fact, Congress became suf-
ficiently concerned about the obsequious compliance of American
companies with Arab demands to boycott Israel and her trading
40 Id,
411d. 3, 61-64 (Table 4-3: "A Sampling of Foreign Firms Involved in the
American Manufacturing Sector"), 71.
42 But see id. 73 (discriminatory employment practices of Japanese employers
favoring Japanese citizens).
4 3 See Suncos. ON OVERsIGHT AND INVEsTIGATIONS OF Tim HOUSE CONMI.
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREm CoMMvrERCE, 94TH CoNG., 2D SESS., REPORT oN TnE
ARAB Boycorr Asm AMERICAN Busxuzss (Subcomm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited
as AaBa BoycoTT REPoRT]; Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign
Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11, at 442-66 (1975). See
generally D. CrmL, THE AaRA BoycoTT OF Isinmm (1976); A. LowmqF=, TRADE
CONTROLS FOR PoI'mcAL ENDs 95-146 (1977); W. NEISON & T. PnrrnE, ThE
EcoNoiNc WAR AGAiNST THE JEws (1977); Friedman, Confronting the Arab
Boycott: A Lawyer's Baedeker, 19 HAEv. INT'L L.J. 443 (1978); Guzzardi, That
Curious Barrier at the Arab Frontier, FoRTuNE, July 1975, at 82; Turck, The Arab
Boycott of Israel, 55 FORmcN ArE. 472 (1977).
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partners that it enacted legislation designed to penalize such prac-
tices. 44 But there is only so much that one sovereign nation can do
respecting the actions of other sovereign nations, and no doubt
many of these boycott demands continue to be made. Moreover,
some Arab countries do not even grant entry visas to American
citizens who are Jewish or of Israeli origin,45 raising the specter
that similar discriminations might be imposed by Arab owners who
take over domestic operations.46 By failing to recognize the uniquely
ideological orientation of many Arab investors, Professor Fry may
have unduly sanitized a debate that demands more unsettling
analysis.
Finally, foreign investment is but one rivulet in the stream of
international commerce. Import restrictions, comparative wage
scales, abundance of natural resources, transportation facilities,
market access, and currency exchange rates all affect the amount of
foreign capital that comes to this country.47 The Middle Eastern
44 The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52,
tit. H, §201(a), 91 Stat. 244 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §2403-1a (Supp. II
1978)). See H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This statute
imposes civil and criminal penalties on American companies who comply with
certain aspects of the Arab boycott, including requests for information about a
person's religion, national origin, or fraternal organization memberships. 50 U.S.C.
app. §2403-la(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978). See Pfeifer, Anti-Boycott Legislation:
The Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 19 HARv. INTrL. L.J. 349 (1978).
See generally Saltoun, Regulation of Foreign Boycotts, 33 Bus. LAw. 559 (1978).
Major exceptions are provided for compliance with import-export restrictions and
certain other limitations. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403-la(a) (2) (Supp. II 1978).
See also Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1061-1064, 90 Stat. 1649
(adding I.R.C. §§908, 952(a)(3), 995(b)(1)(F)(ii), and 999, denying certain
tax benefits and export incentives to American taxpayers participating in the Arab
boycott). See generally Kaplan, Income Taxes and the Arab Boycott, 32 TAx LAw.
313 (1979).
41 See Kaplan, supra note 44, at 340 & n.182 (visa restrictions imposed by
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).
46 See Marsh, Book Review, COMMNTARY, Feb. 1978, at 86, 88 (noting re-
strictive hiring by American architectural firms doing business in the Middle East).
Another manifestation of this discriminatory attitude was the attempt, eventually
unsuccessful, by the Kuwait International Investment Company to have Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith exclude "Jewish" banks from two bond issues
comanaged by the Kuwait Company and Merrill Lynch. ARAB Boycorr REPORT,
supra note 43, at 11. When such discrimination can be proved, the aggrieved
party may have a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.), but proof problems
are often difficult in this area. See Comment, The Arab Boycott and Title VII,
12 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 181 (1977).
47For example, during the seven years ending April 1978, the dollar fell in
value 63% against the Japanese yen, 81% against the German mark, and 131%
against the Swiss franc. E. FRY, supra note 3, at 36. When combined with major
declines in United States stock prices, which reduced the dollar cost of American
companies, these currency fluctuations meant that foreign investors could act like




phenomenon is, once again, quite unique in this regard. It is in-
extricably intertwined with a massive transfer of wealth that is both
ongoing and unparalleled. In 1980, for example, the Arab nations are
expected to amass dollar surpluses for this one year of $120 billion,
up from $5.3 billion as recently as two years ago.4 Put simply, the
frequent oil price boosts by OPEC have concentrated more dis-
posable income in fewer hands than ever before.49 Hands, by the
way, that understand quite clearly where the relative balance of
economic "interdependence" lies,3 0 as the recent debacle involving
the film "Death of a Princess" vividly demonstrated.1
To make matters worse, significant portions of these massive
dollar surpluses have been deposited, on short-term basis, in major
American banks, who have then loaned these funds to poor Third
World countries seeking cash to buy their oil.52 In fact, these
loans to less developed countries already exceed the combined
equity capital and loan loss reserves of the banks involved by some
thirty percent.5" By combining the treachery of lending long while
4 sPaul, Arabs Buying Up U.S.? For Now, at Any Rate, They Arenrt Inter-
ested, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
49 By the end of 1980, the Arab nations will have $340 billion invested world-
wide, a tripling of their cumulative investment since 1975. Fully 80% of this total
represents the investments of just four countries: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates. Arab Banks Grow, BusiMss WEEK, Oct. 6, 1980, at
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borrowing short with the lunacy of lending capital funds for cur-
rent expenses,5M the leading banks of this country have been posi-
tioned quite literally between Scylla and Charybdis. As a result,
the bedrock of our banking system is now largely subject to the
whim of these "foreign investors."
The genuine financial risks and unique political characteristics
of the recent surge in Arab country investment demands that these
investments be analyzed separately from other, more traditionally
oriented foreign investments. By following the all too common
practice of ignoring this distinction, Professor Fry simply substitutes
myopia for xenophobia and weakens his book's usefulness and
importance.
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